On UK’s Strategic Engagement with post-Assad Syria and Türkiye

Executive Summary

The fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024 created a critical inflection point for British foreign policy. The UK has begun recalibrating its approach — moving away from a primarily punitive sanctions regime toward supporting Syria's economic recovery and political stabilisation. Pickthall House advocates for a decisive, independent British strategy that advances national security, economic interests, and humanitarian objectives in the new Syrian context.

Current UK Actions and Statements

The UK's response has so far been cautious and largely reactive. Key actions include Foreign Secretary David Lammy reaffirming £4bn in humanitarian aid commitments (December 2024), UK Ambassador Barbara Woodward calling for Syrian democracy at the UN Security Council (January 2025), and UK participation in an Arab-led summit in Saudi Arabia focused on reconstruction and Assad-era accountability. The UK has coordinated with the US, EU, France, Germany, and Italy, while European allies — including Spain, Germany, and Qatar — have independently accelerated engagement with Damascus.

Sanctions and Their Impact

UK sanctions remain a significant obstacle to Syria's economic recovery. While food and medicine are exempt, broader financial restrictions have choked economic stabilisation. In February 2025, Minister Stephen Doughty announced a revised sanctions framework aimed at enabling recovery while maintaining targeted restrictions. By March 2025, the UK had lifted asset freezes on 24 Syrian entities, including the Central Bank of Syria and Syrian Airlines, though full economic normalisation has not yet been pursued.

Recognise and Support the Transitional Government

Pickthall House recommends that the UK formally recognise Syria's transitional government as a legitimate governing authority. The administration has demonstrated state-building competency, a pluralistic and consensus-driven governance approach, and effective counterterrorism measures against ISIS elements. UK support should be conditioned on alignment with these principles, with caution exercised toward groups — including certain Kurdish factions — that have suppressed protests in SDF-controlled areas.

Pursue an Independent Diplomatic and Economic Strategy

As a post-Brexit power, the UK has the flexibility to act independently in pushing for coordinated international sanctions removal, particularly US secondary sanctions that impede third-party economic engagement with Syria. Foreign direct investment should prioritise infrastructure, renewable energy to reduce Iranian and Russian fuel dependency, and sustainable agriculture. The UK should build stronger ties with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Qatar rather than relying solely on the US and EU frameworks.

Maintain Syria's Territorial Sovereignty

The UK should take a firmer diplomatic stance against Israeli military interventions and land grabs in Syria, which contradict the UK's stated commitment to a rules-based international order. The paper also cautions against supporting SDF-affiliated Kurdish autonomy arrangements that would undermine Syrian national unity and risk long-term instability. Coordinating with Türkiye on counterterrorism and stabilisation — including intelligence sharing — would enhance regional security and prevent Syria from becoming a base for Iranian military expansion.

Manage Refugee Returns

The UK should facilitate voluntary, phased return mechanisms for Syrian refugees wishing to participate in reconstruction, without forcing large-scale immediate returns. This includes allowing non-naturalised Syrian refugees in the UK to travel back and forth without losing residency status, and partnering with Qatar's initiative to fund public sector salaries in Syria to support economic reintegration.

Concerns about HTS and Extremism

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) remains proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the UN, US, EU, and UK. However, HTS has demonstrably shifted away from its early ideological roots, embracing pluralistic governance and distancing its leadership from Salafi-jihadism. Positive indicators include the appointment of a female, Christian Minister for Social Affairs, and British-educated figures in senior government roles. The UK should monitor HTS carefully for signs of backsliding while remaining open to engagement conditional on continued moderation.

The Role of the US and EU

The US is primarily using sanctions as leverage over Syria's post-war political order rather than facilitating recovery — a dynamic that risks entrenching instability. The EU has taken a more cautious approach, reducing some restrictions while delivering humanitarian aid, but its fragmented decision-making limits its effectiveness. By contrast, the UK's Embassy in Syria under Ann Snow has been actively building goodwill with local authorities and is well-positioned to lead constructive engagement.

Conclusion

A pragmatic, independent British foreign policy on Syria — one that supports sovereignty, recovery, and stability while countering Iranian and Russian influence — would strengthen the UK's strategic position in the Middle East. The UK's existing diplomatic goodwill and the British education of many senior Syrian government figures represent tangible assets that should be capitalised on decisively and without delay.